Introduction
In the first eleven months of Ofcom's existence, it has launched over 60 consultations, to add to the responsibilities inherited from the regulators that it has subsumed, plus the extra 135 duties given to it by Parliament. It has initiated two major reviews of broadcasting and telecommunications, as it comes to grips with overseeing a media, telecom and communications industry worth £40bn.
I do not propose to give a review of the whole avalanche of regulatory activity since January. I shall instead focus on the two big reviews that Ofcom has undertaken: on public service broadcasting, and telecommunications. And in particular, I want to see how Ofcom understands broadcasting and telecommunications: how does it see these markets developing?; what does it see as being the major regulatory challenges?; and what does it think it can do about them?
My main conclusions are as follows:
1. There is little evidence that externalities (whether citizenship or some other kind) are important enough to justify the current degree of intervention in broadcasting. If externalities are used as the main argument, then funding of public service broadcasting (and the BBC in particular) is likely to come under increasing pressure. But there are still grounds for large-scale intervention in broadcasting, due to the high valuation that most people attach to broadcasting services; and the non-rivalrous nature of broadcasting, even in the digital era.
2. There is insufficient backing for Ofcom's proposal to make only £300 million per annum of PSB funding contestable. There is a clear theoretical argument for making all PSB funding contestable; and some grounds for dividing the funding pie more finely. Recent empirical evidence indicates some of the problems with these options. The issues need to be balanced within an explicit theoretical framework that then allows evidence to be collected to assess where the balance should be struck.
3. The local loop continues to be one of the most problematic parts for telecoms regulation. It is the area that has been most resistant to the introduction of competition, and the area that exposes most clearly regulators' attitudes towards the balance between competition and regulation. Recent evidence suggests that regulation mandating local loop unbundling may be ineffective in developing local loop competition. And that the presence of a vertically-integrated incumbent in a downstream market can limit competition in that market.
4. The local loop is a particular example of a more general issue in telecommunications: the creation and control of bottlenecks. Bottlenecks will be a recurring problem for the regulator. Ofcom needs to develop a coherent policy towards bottlenecks and vertical integration well in advance: in particular, under what conditions to mandate access to bottlenecks, and to enforce structural separation. 1 I have acted as an external economic advisor to Ofcom over the last 12 months. The views expressed in this paper are entirely mine. This paper is available for download from http://www.soton.ac.uk/~ram2/.
The Public Service Broadcasting Review
The Communications Act (2003) calls on Ofcom first to report on how, taken together, the existing public service broadcasters are delivering on the range of public service criteria set out in the Act; and secondly, to make recommendations to Parliament "with a view to maintaining and strengthening the quality of public service television broadcasting in the United Kingdom".
In its Phase 1 report, Ofcom concluded that broadcasting on the main terrestrial TV channels has partially, but not completely, fulfilled the requirements of the Communications Act. Ofcom found some significant achievements, but also important shortcomings in effectiveness, partly due to the actions of broadcasters, and partly because viewers have drifted away from the more challenging types of programming. A survey of 6,000 individuals, combined with focus group analysis and interviews, indicate that the public like and value public service broadcasting. While Ofcom recognises that the market unaided would produce PSB programming, it concludes that it would not do so in sufficient quantity or sufficient breadth. In its Phase 2 report, Ofcom presents its proposals to maintain and strength PSB. At the heart of these proposals is a continued role for the BBC funded by a licence fee; a diminished role for channels 3 and 5; and the creation of a new "Public Service Publisher".
In the rest of this section, I want first to review Ofcom's conceptual framework for public service broadcasting, in order to lay out its primary argument for continued regulation of broadcasting. I want then to ask whether it has gathered sufficient evidence to back up this argument; and to make suggestions about what it has to do to gather that evidence. Finally, I want to question the grounds for its proposals for future regulation: in particular, how much competition should there be in broadcasting?
The rationale for public service broadcasting
The starting point of any review of public service broadcasting in the UK is to define public service broadcasting. In its Phase 1 report, Ofcom proposes its own version: the purposes of public service broadcasting are 1. to inform ourselves and others and to increase our understanding of the world through news, information and analysis of current events and ideas; 2. to reflect and strengthen our cultural identity through high quality UK, national, and regional programming; 3. to stimulate our interest in and knowledge of arts, science, history and other topics through content that is accessible, encourages personal development and promotes participation in society; and 4. to support a tolerant and inclusive society through the availability of programmes which reflect the lives of different people and communities within the UK, encourage a better understanding of different cultures and perspectives and, on occasion, bring the nation together for shared experiences.
This is somewhat different from Reith's "inform, educate and entertain", but is clearly a descendant of that objective. The Communications Act (2003) is somewhat more prescriptive. It states that the purposes of public service broadcasting are:
1. to deal with a wide range of subjects; 2. to cater for the widest possible range of audiences across different times of day and through different types of programme; and 3. to maintain high standards of programme-making.
The fulfilment of these purposes is taken to mean that PSB will:
• inform, educate and entertain; and • support an appropriate range and proportion of production outside London.
The Act goes on to specify different types of programming that should be supported (for example, a wide range of "different sporting and other leisure interests", and "acts of worship and other ceremonies and practices"). The authors of the Davies report (1999) are more cautious, concluding that "we may not be able to offer a tight new definition of public service broadcasting, but we nevertheless each felt that we knew it when we saw it". The report is more explicit when it says that "form of market failure must lie at the heart of any concept of public service broadcasting. Beyond simply using the catch-phrase that public service broadcasting must inform, educate and entertain , we must add inform, educate and entertain in a way which the private sector, left unregulated, would not do . Otherwise, why not leave matters entirely to the private sector?" I shall return to this point later. In a speech to the Royal Television Society on 14 October 1998, Chris Smith (the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport who commissioned the Davies report) stated that "the BBC [and hence public service broadcasting] should act as a benchmark for quality, driving up standards across the board; it should provide something for everybody, making the good popular and the popular good; it should inform, educate and entertain, expanding people's horizons with new and innovative programming; it should operate efficiently and effectively and provide value for money for licence fee payers; it should stimulate, support and reflect the diversity of cultural activity in the United Kingdom, acting as a cultural voice for the nation". The Peacock committee, set up in 1985-86 by then-prime minister Margaret Thatcher, identified the following list of elements which make up public service broadcasting: geographic universality; catering for all interests and tastes; catering for minorities; concern for 'national identity and community'; detachment from vested interests and government; one broadcasting system to be directly funded by the corpus of users; competition in good programming rather than for numbers.
So, while there is some common ground to these definitions, there are some significant differences. In particular, opinions clearly differ about the inclusion of certain types of programming, such as arts, religion and some types of regional programming. This point will turn out to be important when I discuss, below, how public service broadcasting is to be valued.
Having defined PSB, the next question is: why does the government have to intervene in broadcasting? The definition of PSB in the Davies' report raises the question most clearly: why will the private sector fail to provide PSB? Let me rehearse briefly the traditional arguments for government intervention in broadcasting, in order to explain Ofcom's view of the future.
From the start, government has been intimately involved in broadcasting. At several points, there have been calls for the government to take over the BBC (notably during the General Strike of 1926 and the Suez Crisis of 1956). Ofcom has calculated that the full cost of intervention in public service broadcasting in the UK amounts to just under £3 billion per annum, or not far off one day's gross domestic product for the UK. The government grants licences (via its regulator) to terrestrial broadcasters. In exchange for the right to broadcast, these companies (the BBC, the ITV, Channel 4, 5, and S4C) have to fulfill PSB obligations.
I should like to concentrate first on the standard economic arguments for intervention. The basic reason is the existence of market failure. There are a number of different possible market failures in broadcasting. The most basic, and least controversial, is that broadcasting uses the scarce resource of electromagnetic spectrum; and without government intervention, the externalities inherent in free use of the spectrum would lead to inefficiencies. The importance of this market failure will vary according to technology. Analogue television broadcasting is spectrum-hungry, so that there is room for only a small number of broadcasters within the UK. Digital transmission enables several television channels to be carried in the space used by analogue signals to carry one channel. Smart devices are able to pick up a particular signal from a mix of signals, reducing the problem of interference. Nevertheless, there is likely always to be a co-ordinating role in the allocation and use of spectrum.
The next argument, in terms of the degree of controversy, is that broadcasting is a public good. With a standard private good, only the owner of the good can consume the good (unless he or she agrees to transfer ownership to someone else). Other people can, therefore, be excluded from consuming the good. And once the good is consumed, it is used up. So consumption is rivalrous: either I or you can eat the last biscuit in the tin, but not both of us. Public goods are the exact opposite: they are nonexcludable and non-rivalrous in consumption. The owner of a public good cannot stop others from consuming the good. And consumption of the good by one person does not decrease the amount of the good left for everyone else.
Broadcasting includes many features of a public good-one person watching a television programme does not prevent others from watching the same programme. Because consumption does not reduce the amount available for others, the social value of non-rivalrous goods is given by the sum of everyone's willingness to pay, rather than an individual's valuation. The social value of a TV programme is therefore the aggregated valuation of all those people who might watch the programme, not just those that do. But non-excludability means that it is very difficult to persuade anyone to pay for the good, since they can access freely. There is a strong incentive to free-ride: enjoy the benefits of consumption without paying, in the the hope that others will foot the cost. Of course, if everyone thinks like this, then no one pays and the public good is not provided. But this is socially inefficient: it is optimal for the public good to be produced (every one gains from consuming it). Hence, provision of such a good by the private sector is likely to be inefficient.
A further potential market failure arises from the economies of scale in broadcasting The making and broadcasting of television programmes has exceptionally high fixed costs and very low marginal costs -it costs no more to make a programme available to extra people (within range of a given transmitter system). This cost structure has tended to limit the number of firms that enter the broadcasting market (at least, that part that commissions new programmes; and that transmits broadcasts). The result is a highly concentrated industry, with a small number of vertically-integrated broadcasters. The lack of competition in this structure can lead to both productive and allocative inefficiencies.
The most controversial market failure involves content. Here, two arguments are usually presented. The first is that, in the absence of direct funding (e.g., through a licence fee) or subscription pricing (made possible by conditional access technology), broadcasters must rely on advertising income. With pure advertising funding. a broadcaster's aim is to maximize audience size in order to maximize advertising revenues. Some argue that this form of funding leads to too little diversity in programming (from a social perspective). As Anderson and Coates (2003) and Duke and Gal-Or (2003) make clear, however, the issue is complicated: they show that advertising-funded broadcasters may over-provide programming. But there is support from these studies for the general conclusion that funding through advertising involves inefficiencies.
The second argument is that the consumption of broadcasting content is subject to externalities. Externalities are spill-over effects that occur when the social costs and benefits derived from some activity are different from the costs and benefits derived by the producers and consumers of the products. Externalities can be positive or negative and can arise from production and/or consumption. Externalities lead to market failure because the full costs and benefits of an activity are not borne by the same people.
Externalities may exist in broadcasting. Suppose that television has some influence on the behaviour of the people who watch it. If viewing violent programmes tends to make people more violent, then the negative effect of more violence in society will not necessarily be factored in correctly by programme-makers, whose objective may be to maximize the size of the viewing audience rather than pursuing the wider social good. Typically, markets over-produce activities that involve negative externalities. Similarly, certain types of programming might help to induce greater tolerance and inclusiveness, constructive engagement in the democratic process, "network" externalities (see e.g., Brookes (2004) ), and other behaviour that are beneficial to society as a whole. The positive externalities involved are unlikely to be incorporated fully by broadcasters when making commissioning and transmission decisions. Typically, markets under-produce activities that involve positive externalities.
Ofcom uses the phrase "citizenship externalities", perhaps to persuade those who object to the market failure rationale for intervention. But this label should not obscure the basic fact that this is a very standard form of market failure. There is nothing new or revolutionary in the concept: it is familiar to A-level economics students and economists have been thinking about it for over one hundred years. (The term "external economies" seems to appear first in Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics, published in 1890.) The value of seeing Ofcom's "citizenship externality" as just another type of externality is that it allows the body of work developed by economists over many years to be brought to bear on the problem. Broadcasting in the UK is not the only market ever to suffer from externalities. The precise form of the externalities may be particular to UK broadcasting (perhaps that is all that the qualifier "citizenship" is meant to mean). But the general inefficiencies arising from externalities have been encountered in fields as disparate as the environment, education, health, and marriage.
It is often stated that broadcasting is a merit good. In the case of a merit good, society deems that the good is is undervalued by consumers in normal market exchanges. Exactly why the good is undervalued does not have to be specified, and will anyway depend on the case in question. More often than not, the argument is that individuals are imperfectly informed about the benefits from consuming the good. This lies behind making school education compulsory for children. For adults, Ofcom has stated: "television has the capacity either to restrict or expand the knowledge, experience and imagination of individuals. If all television is provided via the free market, there is a danger that consumers will under-invest in the development of their own tastes, experience and capacity to comprehend because it is only in retrospect that the benefits of such investment become apparent." This is a tricky line of argument. When the notion of a merit good is clearly defined, the argument smacks of paternalism; when it is not, the argument is indistinguishable from market failure through externalities.
Public intervention in the digital world
These, then, are the standard reasons given for intervention in broadcasting. How do these reasons stand up to the onset of digital broadcasting? Ofcom's view is, largely. that most of the market failures will be eliminated.
The arguments go, briefly, as follows. Digitization means that broadcast signals can easily be encrypted; only viewers who have been given a "key" (e.g., a viewing card or PIN number) are able to decrypt the signal and watch the transmission. If they could not encrypt their signals, pay-TV providers would struggle to make any money. But they can, and they do. Technically, this means that broadcasting is no longer a pure public good: while it is still non-rivalrous in consumption, it is no longer necessarily non-excludable.
What about market concentration? The economies of scale in broadcasting are still there. New digital technology has helped to reduce programme production costs significantly. Rather than recording on to a tape or DVD, programmes filmed digitally can be saved straight on to a computer hard disk. Once there, they can be transferred easily to the many different units around the country that are involved in production. (Previously, a man in a van had to drive the tapes or DVDs around.) Other tasks, such as retrieval of information and sub-titling, is also easier digitally. But even so, the fixed costs of programming and broadcasting are still enormous compared to the marginal costs.
Spectrum scarcity, on the other hand, which restricted the number of terrestrial analogue channels in the UK to 5, is largely a thing of the past. The better use of the spectrum that digitization allows means that the number of channels is, if not limitless, then enough to be getting on with. This means that while the number of firms that commission original programming and run broadcast facilities may remain small, the number of firms involved in bundling old programmes into packages to appeal to various audience groups (such as comedy, cooking, DIY and home improvement) can be very large. The amount of competition at the level of channels can be very large, even if the amount of competition in commissioning is limited by the large costs involved.
Ofcom also argues that advertising-funded programming will become more diverse. The proliferation of channels allowed by digital technology means that niche audiences can be targetted by broadcasters, and hence advertisers. There is no evidence (either theoretical or empirical) that the outcome will be efficient in any sense; but, Ofcom argues, at least the range of programming available should broaden.
That leaves externalities and merit goods. These sources of market failure, if they exist, are unaffected by whether out TV pictures get to us by analogue or digitally: what matters is what happens when they get there. Ofcom has identified these market failures, which it summarizes in the phrase "citizen externality", as the core of continued intervention in broadcasting. To quote from the PSB Phase I report, Ofcom's argument is that "programming that has wider social value, and which most of us would like to see provided, would either be under-provided or not provided at all [by an unregulated market]" (p. 75 of the Phase 1 report). Hence Ofcom concludes that "the rationale for a continued investment in PSB is that only with such an intervention would TV serve UK citizens adequately" (p. 75).
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At the rationale for intervention changes due to digitization, so the sustainability of the current regulatory regime becomes questionable. The current public service broadcasters in the UK receive, in exchange for their PSB obligations, privileged access to spectrum. As the audience using the analogue spectrum declines, the value of this privileged access will decrease until, eventually, it will fall below the costs of meeting public service obligations. Ofcom estimates that ITV1, Channel 4 and Five currently receive approximately £400m a year in implicit subsidies for PSB. By the time that the analogue broadcasting signal is switched off, these implicit subsidies will be close to zero. If PSB is to be maintained and strengthened, Ofcom argues, then a new arrangement must be devised.
In summary, Ofcom has concluded that the broadcasting market fails due to externalities; and that explicit funding (rather than implicit, through gifted spectrum) must be provided to correct the market failure. To quote from the Phase 1 report: "As digital take-up progresses, with multichannel provision, encryption systems and a wide variety of different models of consumption, the market failures associated with consumers not being able to watch the programmes they would willingly buy are diminishing fast. We believe that in the future, public service broadcasting will no longer be needed to ensure consumers can buy and watch their own choice of programming.
There may also be a distributional concern: "there is an argument that where the market delivered programming of quality, range and balance, much of it would probably be provided on a pay-per-view basis, only for those who could afford it" (p. 75).
There may remain concerns about the market power of some broadcasters, but in our view these are better dealt with by the application of competition law than through a large public intervention. ...
Bridging the shortfall between what a well-functioning broadcasting market would provide and the wider ambitions of UK citizens is our definition of the enduring purposes of public service broadcasting. It constitutes a continuing rationale for PSB, one which, for the time being, retains widespread public support." (p. 9, Phase 1 report.)
The evidence: how important are externalities?
Public funding of broadcasting in the UK comes to not far off one day's gross domestic product. Can the market failures identified in the previous section justify this degree of intervention? In particular, are externalities really that large? In this section, I argue that there is little evidence that externalities are that important. So, if Ofcom comes to rely on this argument alone to justify PSB, it is likely that the scale of funding, particularly of the BBC, will come under increasing pressure. But there are still, potentially, grounds for significant intervention in broadcasting, due to the high valuations that most individuals attach to television; and the non-rivalrous nature of broadcasting, even in the digital era.
What is the evidence that externalities are worth £3 billion per annum? How large are externalities in broadcasting? There is very little evidence on this question, which is perhaps why so much pure theory is written. (For example, Brookes (2004) contains no quantitative measurement of the extent to which a free market in broadcasting would underproduce social capital.) This measurement question is difficult to answer, of course, since the usual places that economists would look (i.e., markets) are largely missing. To answer the question "how important do individuals think X is", an economist will usually look at a market in which X is traded to see what price has been paid. In a competitive market, the prevailing price will equal the willingness-to-pay of the marginal individual who buys X, and the incremental cost of the marginal seller of X. In a sense which the economic theory behind competitive markets makes precise, the price measures the value of X. When there is no, or an imperfect market for X (because, say, X is an externality, such as "social values" or "diversity"), there is no such (reliable) measure of value. I am aware of three possible sources that can be used to form a rough estimate. The first is the Mori analysis commissioned by Ofcom in the Phase 2 report. The primary objective of the study was to examine "How much value (both monetary and evaluative) viewers place upon PSB output once costs are attached, within a framework of benefit to society as a whole rather than individual personal preference". Six groups of 20-25 participants were asked to evaluate five different programming schedules, which varied according to the degree of "public serviceness". Participants were first asked to rank the five schedules according to their own, personal preference, with no information given about the price of the schedule. They were then asked to rank the schedules, again with no price information, based on their opinions about what would be the best schedule for society. Then varying degrees of price information was given, including the actual price of the schedules, in terms of an increase or decrease in the licence fee.
The analysis contains a great deal of interesting data, but falls short of giving enough information to assess the monetary value of externalities. The only instance when the participants were asked for their personal (rather than their social) preference was at the outset, without price information attached. The majority of participants chose what was in fact the least-cost schedule with the lowest degree of "public serviceness". This schedule would require an annual licence free of £91. In contrast, a weak majority of participants chose a schedule with a licence fee of £121 (i.e., the same as the current fee), as the socially preferred schedule when price information was given. These figures suggest, but only very vaguely, an externality value (the difference between personal and social valuations) of £30 per annum. Put differently, approximately one-quarter of the current licence fee can be attributed to externalities; the remaining three-quarters relates to the personal preferences of selfish individuals. This calculation should be treated with extreme caution, however. The figure of £91 is unlikely to be an accurate measure of personal valuations, since at that stage of the survey, the participants did not know the schedule prices. In addition, there are too few data points to form accurate or precise estimates.
A second attempt to estimate the values of externalities uses the data from the recent BBC and Human Capital (2004) report. In this analysis, the BBC looks to measure its value. 1,136 people were asked to state their opinions about the total, social value of the BBC, while a separate sample of 1,121 people were asked to state the value of the BBC to consumers only. For the first sample, the alternative was total closure of the BBC; for the second sample, the alternative was exclusion from watching the BBC. Hence, any calculations relate to the externalities generated by the BBC alone, rather than (public service) broadcasting more generally. The study found that, on average, the "consumer value" of the BBC was between £220 and £224 per annum, while the "social value" was between £248 and £282 per annum. (The ranges come from different methods of eliciting valuations from survey participants.) The average value of externalities-the gap between private and social values-was therefore between £28 and £58 per annum; or between 11% and 21% of social value.
Again, there are obvious holes in this calculation. In particular, it identifies the BBC's current scheduling as being the appropriate public service broadcasting benchmark, from which the gap between private and social values can be measured. This restricts the choices of the survey participants, who might, for example, choose two different schedules for their private and social preferences. It is not possible to say, however, whether this leads to an under-or over-estimate of the value of externalities in this calculation.
One last attempt to arrive at the size of broadcasting externalities comes from a study of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) by Finn et al. (2003) . These authors used contingent valuation and contingent choice techniques 3 to estimate use and non-use values of the programming services provided by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). They received 577 responses from a mail-survey sample of 2,404 households from a survey conducted in September 1998. They estimated a total household value for the CBC of $5.03 per household. Of this, $3.70 was the value of the average respondent's own household having access, and $1.33 was the value to the average household of other Canadian households having access to the services. This represents an aggregated yearly value of $664m for the total value of the CBC, with about $488m (or 74%) coming from private effects and $175m (or 26%) coming from external effects.
There are major problems with all of these calculations and they should all be treated with great caution. A major message, then, is that more work needs to be done to quantify externalities. But from these calculations, there is limited evidence that externalities are all that large in broadcasting. Private (or consumer) valuations appear to make up between 75% and 90% of social valuations. If these figures are remotely correct, then they suggest that a large portion of the funding of broadcasting can be left to the free market meeting the demands of consumers. Additional funding to meet "citizens' needs" would be a relatively modest component of the total.
In fact, I do think that there are grounds for more extensive intervention in broadcasting, precisely because individuals' private valuations for television are so large. The basic point can be seen in a simple example. I want to work with just two individuals. I shall use figures from the BBC/Human Capital study; and from that study, the "service valuation" and "national voting method" figures for private and social values. Figure 1 below reproduces figure 7 in the BBC/Digital World report. The figure shows that e.g., a third of respondents state a private willingness-to-pay of £20 per month i.e., £240 annually (around twice the current licence fee) for BBC services. The median private willingness-to-pay is around £15 per month i.e., 50% more than the current licence fee. The figure also shows the corresponding social willingness-to-pay statements, which, on the whole, are quite similar. Figure 2 (which is figure 8 in the BBC/Digital World report) shows the data in a slightly different way, which makes clearer how small the gap between private and social values is, relative to the average level of private values. To convert these data for my two-person example, consider the top 25% and 75% of participants, in terms of stated willingness-to-pay. A simple calculation shows that the top 25% of participants, in terms of stated willingness-to-pay, have a private valuation of at least £293 per annum, and a social valuation of at least £329 per annum. The top 75% of participants, in terms of stated willingness-topay, have a private valuation of at least £123 per annum, and a social valuation of at least £137 per annum.
So, suppose that person A's private valuation of the schedule is £293, and person B's is £123; and that their social valuations are £329 and £137. Table 1 shows the socially efficient and private provision outcomes, according to the cost of providing the programming schedule. This example assumed implicitly that broadcasting is a private good: both excludable and rivalrous. But in fact, even in the digital era, broadcasting is non-rivalrous. To see the consequence of this, suppose that externalities are zero; but note now that the social valuation from the programming schedule is the sum of the private values i.e., the social valuation is £416. Inefficiency is greater in this case, in two senses: (i) when inefficiency occurs, its value is greater; (ii) the range of costs over which inefficiency occurs is wider. Why is this the case? The reason is that private valuations are larger than the value of externalities. In the first example, externalities are worth £36 for person A and £14 for person B. In the example, the inefficiency is never greater than the externality experienced by an individual; and hence the inefficiency is never greater than £36. In the second example, social and private valuations differ by as much as the private valuation of person B; since this is large (£123), the inefficiency is large.
Cost per person (£)
It is often argued that the non-rivalry argument has no bite, since there are many industries in which it is relatively costless to supply additional individuals. For example, David Elstein (2004) has noted that:
"The marginal cost of producing an extra copy of a newspaper is virtually zero, yet unsold copies of newspapers with a cover price are not given away. At the end of the day, newsagents wrap them up and return them to the publishers, who pulp them rather than hand them out. Likewise, empty cinema seats are not offered to freeloaders, just because the cash demand for them has been exhausted and they would otherwise go to waste." This is a reasonable point, and one that can only be answered fully by appealing to evidence. The trade-offs are the following. Intervention has costs, inevitably. For example, collecting the mandatory licence fee costs around £120 million per annum; running a regulator is not cheap. These costs have to be compared to the benefits from intervention: the value of the inefficiencies which are corrected. I have argued that the inefficiency that arises from non-rivalry in broadcasting is large, since individuals' valuations appear to be large. This means that the gap between the social value (i.e., the sum of all private values) and private values is significant. Other markets may also have non-rivalrous features (or at least, a low marginal cost). The question then is: how large are private valuations? In the example that I gave above, if the private value of person B is £20 rather than £123, then the extent of inefficiency is a lot less. If these valuations described e.g., the movie market, then the conclusion may well be that movies should be provided by an unregulated free market. For other markets with higher individual (and hence total) valuations (broadcasting, for example?), intervention may be justified.
Perhaps all this, in the end, will make no difference. Provided there is some sort of market failure, there is a continued rationale for intervention in broadcasting. But identifying the source of the market failure has implications for scale and future of intervention. To justify the scale of intervention, it is necessary to quantify the size of the market failure. If the market failure is small, then it will be difficult in the long-run to maintain the position that intervention is necessary: that inefficiencies outweigh the inevitable costs of regulation. Intervention can be rendered obsolete. For example, if new technology allows broadcasters to price discriminate more effectively, then they may be able to mitigate the market failure that arises through non-rivalry. Technology is less likely to eliminate externalities (which may be why Ofcom finds them to be so important).
Ofcom's Phase 2 proposals
In this section, I will take the scale of intervention in broadcasting as given, and consider how intervention should be structured: especially, how much competition should there be for public service funding? The proposals set out by Ofcom in phase 2 of its review are quite detailed. I want to concentrate on just one aspect of them (as it happens, the aspect that seems to be attracting the most attention): the creation of a Public Service Publisher (PSP). In summary, Ofcom proposes to leave the BBC largely intact (subject to possible asset transfers to Channel 4). The budget of the PSP will be approximately £300 million per annum. With this budget, the PSP will commission and distribute content on other digital distribution systems such as broadband, networked PVRs, mobile networks as well as cable, satellite and digital terrestrial broadcasting. The right to set up and run the PSP would be awarded after competition between rival organisations; the right to operate the PSP will be granted for a set period of up to 10 years. Only the BBC is barred from gaining the franchise; and winner will have to demonstrate clear separation between its PSP and other (commercial) activities. The review makes some suggestions about how the PSP can be funded (from general taxation, a £12 supplement to the licence fee, or a levy on other broadcasters), but the final decision on this is outside of Ofcom's control.
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Is this degree of funding contestability sufficient? In its Phase 2 report, Ofcom weighted up the pros and cons of establishing a fully contestable PSB fund. On the pros side, Ofcom states that
• it maximises the amount of competition for PSB provision because competition occurs between many suppliers and on a continuous basis; • the high degree of competition for funding should add to the quality of PSB programming and should also drive innovation; and • the central funding body would be able to use the bidding process to exercise control over costs and to avoid duplication, derivative PSB programming and aggressive scheduling. The idea of a publisher is not entirely new. Over the course of its three-year inquiry, the Annan Committee emphasised the importance of greater pluralism (beyond the duopoly of ITV and the BBC) in broadcasting. It proposed an Open Broadcasting Authority that would act as a publisher and draw programming from a new independent production sector, which would be a fount of diversity and of new ideas. In further details spelled out by the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, the new Channel 4 was to bring innovation, extend the range of programmes, serve minority and specialised audiences, and provide educational programming. It was not to engage in ratings rivalries. The largest possible proportion of programmes was to be secured from independent producers. The fourth channel was to be paid for by a levy on the ITV companies, and the size of its budget was independent of the revenue raised by advertisements shown on the channel. See Born (2004) for further discussion.
On the cons side, Ofcom notes that
• the introduction of a PBA [Public Broadcasting Authority] could duplicate many costs;
• multiple commissioners in different organisations would reduce the chance that innovative programmes are funded because only safer programmes would stand a reasonable chance of receiving approval from both organisations; • PSB programming would become fragmented across a wide range of channels, making it harder for viewers to find and diminishing its contribution to PSB purposes; • it would be difficult to secure agreement with commercial channels for the distribution of programming that was not a good fit with the rest of their schedules; • there would be a serious risk that the efficiency of funding would be compromised by subsidising content that would have been produced anyway.
Ofcom therefore concludes that "the risks in establishing a fully contestable PSB fund outweigh the potential benefits" (pp. 60-61, Phase 2 report). This judgement is backed-up by New Zealand's notentirely-successful experience of running an "arts council of the air". Instead, Ofcom opts for an approach "that blends the two approaches above by introducing competition for PSB funding for the first time, but attempts to minimise the bureaucracy and deadweight costs associated with programme-by-programme contestable funding and the lack of a distribution mechanism" (p. 63), through the creation of the PSP. In the light of this observation, I want to raise two questions in this section:
1. What are the arguments for choosing a 90/10 structure (in which the BBC receives £3 billion per annum and the PSP £300 million per annum)? How should alternative splits (e.g., 75/25, or £2.5 billion and £800 million) be evaluated? 2. Should the roles of both the BBC and the PSP be opened to competition?
One limitation of Ofcom's Phase 2 report is that it provides no framework for answering these two questions.
Ofcom sees increased innovation as one of the major benefits of competition. The Phase 2 report makes this view explicit:
"the lack of competition in broadcasting PSB programming risks leading to complacency, inefficient production, lack of innovation, lower quality programming, a narrowing of perspectives and the loss of PSB programming for certain groups" (p. 59).
In a recent speech, David Currie (2004) has stated that the PSP "has to do enough, as a catalyst, to keep the BBC on its mettle and act as a continuing spur to innovation in the BBC and Channel 4." Figure 4 illustrates the model of competition in innovation that is implicit in this statement. The vertical axis measures the BBC's "effort" or spending on innovation; the horizontal axis measures the PSP's innovation effort. The BBC is assumed to respond to innovative effort by the PSP by increasing its own effort. Hence the blue line, which represents the BBC's choice of effort, slopes upward: the greater the PSP's effort, the more the BBC responds with higher effort. A similar point holds for the PSP; when the BBC exerts more innovative effort, the PSP responds by also making more effort. The PSP's reaction to the BBC's effort level is shown as the red line. When there is no PSP, the BBC Concentration index makes some effort toward innovation: the point is marked "monopoly effort". Alternatively, when the BBC faces a well-funded PSP, the final outcome of competition in innovation is for the BBC to exert the "competitive effort 1". Combined with the PSP's effort level, the result (point 1 in the figure) is substantially more effort in total than the monopoly level. This, then, is the basic argument behind Ofcom's belief in competition spurring innovation.
The same figure can be used to assess the implications of awarding different budgets to the BBC and the PSP. In the figure, I have assumed that the PSP's funding of £300 million (marked by the thick black line) is so low that it lies below the "competitive effort 1" level that a PSP with large funding would expend. With this funding constraint, the BBC exerts less effort: its effort level falls from "competitive effort 1" to "competitive effort 2". And obviously, the PSP's effort level falls, from "competitive effort 1" to the budget level. The total amount of innovative effort falls.
There are then two cases to consider. In the first, the combined funding of the BBC and the PSP is large enough to support point 1. In this case, the total amount of innovative effort can be increased by increasing the PSP's funding at the expense of the BBC. In the second case, the combined funding is not enough to meet the efforts required at point 1. In this case, reallocation of funding between the BBC and the PSP makes no difference to the amount of innovation. the amount of innovation that occurs when the PSP's budget constraint bites is enough: the benefits from the extra effort to get to higher effort levels marked "1" may be small. These are questions that require quantitative answers e.g., assessments of how responsive broadcasters are to rivals' innovations.
But the basic point remains: making the funding of the two organizations more equal will not decrease the amount of innovation, and may well increase it.
Should funding be allocated directly to the BBC, which is then subject to regulation that describes the functions that it performs and the services that it supplies? Or should other organizations be able to bid to perform the functions and supply the services of the BBC? The basic message of economic theory is clear: competition outperforms regulation. More explicitly, the competitive process does a better job of revealing the organization that can provide the services more efficiently; and ensure that the services are provided at lower cost to the tax-payer. In order to see why this is the case, it is helpful to view the funding of PSB as a procurement exercise, in which the identity and the public service broadcaster and the amount of funding it is awarded is to be determined. The exercise can be conducted in one of two ways: either by negotiation with a single organization (such as the BBC); or by allocating the role to the organization that declares that it can perform the role for the lowest amount of funding. Viewed in this way, the analysis of Bulow and Klemperer (1986) tells us what to do. Bulow and Klemperer show that a seller of an object can typically do better by attracting one more bidder into an auction, than it can be restricting the number of buyers and negotiating with the smaller number.
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Their result suggests that the value of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. Specifically, negotiation with the BBC over the level of the licence fee will cost licence payers more than allowing competition between the BBC and just one other organization for the supply of the BBC's output. And the more serious bidders there are for the BBC's position, the greater the benefit to licence payers. This argument lies behind statutes such as the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) in the US, that strongly favour the use of auctions in public sector procurement. The next step is to evaluate the option of splitting the total PSB funding into more than two (i.e., £3 billion to the BBC, £300 million to the PSP) units, with competitive bidding for each unit. There are, of course, many issues to be addressed in thinking about this option. How many units? How big, in terms of funding, should each unit be? What obligations should be attached to each unit? (For example, should one unit be reserved for news and current affairs, another for drama, and so on; or would this limit cross-genre innovation?) But some progress can be made thinking about the issue. The more general problem, to which this belongs, is that of designing package auctions: competitive bidding situations in which the seller/procurer must decide not only how to sell to/buy from and for how much, but also how many units to sell/buy. This problem is familiar from the sale of spectrum, where an important sales decision is how many licences of what size to make available for sale. Milgrom (2004) analyses the trade-offs in the packaging decision. A key factor is whether there are complementarities between units. For example, are there benefits to broadcasters to providing both current affairs and drama (if units are defined by programming genre)? Or more generally, to providing more hours or programming rather than less? There are several reasons why this might be so. There may be economies of scale or scope in broadcasting, so that having two units of provision rather than one reduces average costs. There may be learning-by-going effects, where lessons learned e.g., in drama can be used to improve e.g., documentaries. Milgrom shows that offering a larger number of units when some bidders find some unit complementary creates an "exposure problem" that can depress bidding. (The exposure problem comes about when a bidder fails to win the units that it most wants, and ends up bidding more aggressively on a complementary unit that it does not value 7 To be exact: a seller with no bargaining power who can run only an English auction with no reserve price among N+1 symmetric bidders will earn more in expectation than a seller with all the bargaining power, including the ability to make binding commitments. all that highly.) Offering units in large packages, however, can make it hard for small bidders to participate, limiting the amount of competition for the units. In order to determine the optimal number of units, or equivalently the right amount of packaging, these two factors have to be quantified and balanced.
These recent advances in auction theory provide very useful frameworks for thinking about the issue of procuring PSB television; and they also point to some strong conclusions about the benefit of more competition. Of course, there are important qualifications to be made. Bajari et al. (2003) test Bulow and Klemperer's theoretical prediction-that competition is better than negotiation-using data on private sector contracts (the building construction industry in Northern California from 1995-2001). They present three findings. First, more complicated projects are more likely to be awarded by negotiation than by auction. Secondly, auctions are used more when contractors have more idle capacity (i.e., there are more potential bidders). Thirdly, negotiated projects tend to be awarded to larger, more experienced contractors. Their work suggests a number of potential limitations to the use of auctions. Auctions perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders. And so they find that in the private sector, more complicated projects are more likely to be awarded by negotiation than by auction. They also find that auctions stifle communication between buyers and the sellers, preventing the buyer from using the contractor's expertise when designing the project.
These arguments provide partial support for an approach that splits PSB funding. Recognising the difficulties in describing PSB 8 , some part of funding can be allocated directly to an organization (such as the BBC), with negotiation over the scale of funding and the services to be supplied. Recognising the benefits of competition, some part of funding should be made contestable, to ensure that PSB is supplied by the most efficient provider to the benefit of licence payers. Ofcom's proposal has the merit of this pragmatic mixture. But, as I have tried to show, these issues need to be balanced within an explicit theoretical framework that then allows evidence to be collected to assess where the balance should be struck.
The Telecommunications Strategic Review
Ofcom's second major task of the year is a strategic review of the telecommunications market. The Phase 1 report, published in April 2004, examined the current position and prospects for the telecoms sector. In that report, Ofcom posed five general questions for the review:
1. What are the key attributes of a well-functioning market? 2. Where can effective and sustainable competition be achieved? 3. Is there scope significantly to reduce regulation? 4. How can the regulatory framework encourage efficient and timely investment in next-generation networks? 5. Are structural or operational separation of BT or the delivery of full functional equivalence still relevant questions?
(There were a further 16 questions, specific to the Phase 1 report.)
The Phase 2 report, due to be published in early September 2004, has yet to appear. Consequently, this section is shorter than the previous one. In the rest of the section, I argue that a key challenge for Ofom is to develop policy that makes compatible the very different approaches of competition policy and telecommunications regulation. The differences between these two approaches are nowhere clearer than in their treatment of access. I consider three topics: the local loop; bottlenecks; and vertical integration and separation.
Natural monopoly and the local loop
Regulation of telecommunications is motivated by the presence of market failures, particularly large fixed and sunk costs that lead to natural monopoly. (Externalities and public good provision also arise, in the form of universal service.) Economies of scale are an inverse function of consumers served per line, and so should be strongest in the local part of the network where, in the extreme, there is a single consumer per line. More generally, the lower the network density and the shorter the call distance, the more likely it is that natural monopoly prevails.
Given the familiarity of this argument, it is surprising how little hard evidence there is of the technological conditions required for the existence of natural monopoly. Fuss and Waverman (2002) provide a comprehensive survey of econometric analysis of telecommunication cost functions. (See also Gasmi et al. (2002) , chapter 3, for a review of econometric studies of local exchange networks.) They find that the evidence about costs of long-distance services, where natural monopoly is least likely to prevail, is mixed: some studies find increasing returns to scale in this part of the network; others find constant returns to scale. Studies of local services are correspondingly more undecided.
(See Appendix 1 of Fuss and Waverman.) Fuss and Waverman argue that this situation arises due to lack of adequate data and suitable econometric technique. Existing studies typically concentrate on production of a single firm (usually, AT&T in the U.S.); and concentrate on whether there are scale economies in the aggregate, across all services. A key question, however, is whether there are scale economies in individual services (i.e., long-distance, or local). Moreover, since competitive provision levels are likely to be quite different from monopoly levels, it is unreliable to draws inferences from observed data about costs when there are multiple service providers. These criticisms lead Fuss and Waverman to conclude that "econometric evidence of the type surveyed in this chapter should not, and as appeared not to, influence regulators' decisions regarding permissible market structures" (p. 170).
An alternative approach, pioneered by Gasmi et al. (2002) , uses a combination of engineering and econometric analysis to tackle the question of whether and where natural monopoly exists. In this approach, an engineering model of a local exchange network is allied to an economic model of regulation and firm behaviour to assess the impact of alternative regulatory approaches. Their cost proxy LECOM model is used in simulations of different networks to generate cost (pseudo-)data; these data are then used to estimate a translog functional form to give a smooth representation of the telecommunications cost function. Gasmi et al.'s model displays economies of scope for switched services; but returns dis-economies of scope for other parts of the local exchange network. As they note, however, the engineering approach does not model labour inputs (such as managerial effort and expertise) in all that satisfactory a way. In addition, the model is static, omitting important forwardlooking aspects of technology choices.
Finally, Correa (2003) analyses whether scale economies exist in the UK telcommunications industry. She includes data on fixed-link public (i.e., copper-wire-based), cable and mobile companies-all operators who had local loop or access infrastructure-over the period 1990-1997. Analysis of this unbalanced panel (rather than just time-series) data indicates that there are overall constant returns-toscale in the fixed and cable sectors. Her results suggest that there are no significant economies of scale in the local loop in the UK.
So, there is no conclusive econometric evidence of natural monopoly in telecommunications networks. But market outcomes seem to provide clear guidance: despite deregulation in a great many countries, with many different policy regimes, incumbent firms have remained dominant in most markets, and in nearly all local telephony markets. Entry in the latter, where it has happened at all, is very slow. But, as Woroch (2002) points out, the reason for this may not be technological, but strategic. Economies of scale and scope may still exist at the local level; but there are new technologies that have cost characteristics that may support competition. What remains unchanged, however, is the possibility that incumbent suppliers enjoy strategic advantages that tend to fortify any initial advantage they have acquired.
Hence the local loop continues to be one of the most problematic parts for telecoms regulation. It is the area that has been most resistant to the introduction of competition, and the area that exposes most clearly regulators' attitudes towards the balance between competition and regulation. There are two major policy questions:
1. Is competition between infrastructure providers in the local loop necessary for effective competition in the telecommunications market? 2. Does a lack of competition in the local loop lead to lack of competition in downstream markets?
Infrastructure competition is typically contrasted with service competition (i.e., competition between providers of services that all make use of the same monopolistic network). The question is then: which of these forms of competition is to be preferred? The dilemma is summarized well in Bergman et al. (1998) :
"Where it is thought that natural monopoly elements are important, it is often argued that competition is best accommodated via service providers being granted access to a monopoly network infrastructure. Although this type of competition may deliver benefits in the short run as prices move closer to costs, it may undermine ex ante investment incentives on the part of infrastructure firms, particularly if access is granted on relatively favorable terms. The diminished significance of natural monopoly elements in network industries means that competition is now recognized to be a more powerful means of achieving both efficiency and equity objectives than monopoly. Differences in opinion about the form competition should take do arise, however. If policy makers encourage competition via service providers, terms of access must be set so as not to undermine ex ante investment incentives. This is especially important in dynamic network industries like telecoms." Unsurprisingly, opinions differ. Broadly speaking, OFTEL was of the view that only infrastructure competition would bring benefits to consumers. OFTEL therefore implemented a policy in line with this view: access to existing infrastructure in the U.K. has been relatively difficult, or expensive, so that market players have had an incentive to construct alternative infrastructure. In the U.S., on the other hand, there has been strong reliance on service competition. There, access to existing networks has been easy (because of unbundling requirements, the entrants pay only for what they use) and relatively cheap (i.e., it is cost based and the cost are calculated in a favourable way). These two approaches essentially take opposite views on whether competition requires that the incumbent's bottleneck facilities be bypassed or shared. The regulatory systems of other countries lie between these two extremes, and there is considerable variety in approach.
There have been few empirical studies of how access requirements affect the incentives to invest in facilities. Most recently, Crandall et al. (2004) argue that resale and unbundling does not seem to have acted as a stepping stone for new entrants to get a start in the market, followed by a build-out of their own facilities. The authors find that facilities-based line growth relative to unbundled network element (UNE) growth is faster in U.S. states where the cost of UNEs is relatively high. This finding does not rule out altogether the possibility that entrant networks are in a transition stage, currently renting with a view to investing in facilities later. But, given the amount of time over which unbundling has been mandated in the U.S., this possibility is becoming increasingly unlikely. Eisner and Lehman (2001) conclude that each one dollar increase in the statewide average UNE rate results in 3,741 new CLEC facilities-based lines. (Bourreau and Dogan (2004) give a theoretical explanation of these findings.) On the other hand, Chang et al. (2003) find that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers. Hence they find that access regulation affects investment decisions, although in this case, it is the investment of incumbents, rather than entrants, that is investigated.
Similarly, there is little empirical work on whether competition in local loop and downstream markets are related. Faulhaber (2003) analyses intrastate long distance services in the U.S. to assess this hypothesis. Following the restructuring of AT&T, Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) are restricted to telephone operations within Local Access and Transport Areas (LATA) boundaries. All traffic between LATAs (interLATA traffic) has to be handed off to an inter-exchange carrier (IXC).
9
But RBOCs are permitted to carry intrastate intraLATA long distance calls. Faulhaber (2003) finds that for intrastate long-distance calls, in the intraLATA markets in which RBOCs were permitted to compete, there was little entry by non-incumbent IXCs (despite various regulatory attempts to prevent discrimination by RBOCs against IXC rivals). In the interLATA markets, in which RBOCs were not permitted to compete, competition was implemented almost as soon as equal access became available. In short, Faulhaber finds that competition in long-distance markets is less successful when an incumbent is allowed to operate in the (potentially) competitive market.
The empirical evidence is not encouraging for Ofcom. There is no conclusive evidence of natural monopoly, even in the local loop. Economies of scale and scope inherent in networks have not vanished. But the strategic dominance of incumbents is an equally likely explanation of continued concentration in the local loop. The evidence also suggests that regulation mandating local loop unbundling may be ineffective in developing local loop competition. And it suggests that the presence of a vertically-integrated incumbent in a downstream market can limit competition in that market.
These findings stop short of forming a policy conclusion, primarily because they say nothing about the consequences of vertical relationships between the local loop and downstream markets. In order to reach a policy conclusion, it is useful at this point to step away from the specific issue of the local loop, and consider the broader class of situations to which it belongs.
Bottlenecks
The local loop in fixed-line telephony is one example of a more general issue in telecoms-the problem of bottlenecks: the market power associated with them, the social welfare losses that occur due to market power, and the appropriate regulation of the price and other terms of access to the bottleneck. In this section, I discuss two issues: what creates a bottleneck? And what are the policy approaches to them?
What exactly is a bottleneck? An engineering definition is that it is a system capacity constraint that may result in reduced data flow during peak load conditions. Competition policy uses the notion of an essential facility: that is, any input 2. a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the essential facility; 3. the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 4. the feasibility of providing the facility.
The European Commission has defined an essential facility as "a facility or infrastructure, without access to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers, and which cannot be replicated by any reasonable means". Under U.K. competition law, the fundamental characteristics of an essential facility are:
1. competitors must have access to the facility because it is essential for the provision of goods or services in that related market; and 2. it is not economically efficient, or may not be feasible, for new entrants to replicate the facility.
These definitions have been thrown into some doubt by two recent court rulings. In the U.S., the Supreme Court rejected a refusal-to-deal claim in the case Verizon v. Trinko (January 2004). Curtis Trinko, an AT&T customer, filed a class action lawsuit against Verizon Communications. Trinko alleged that Verizon, the incumbent monopoly local service provider in New York City, had filled rivals' (and AT&T's) orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage customers from becoming or remaining customers of competitive carriers. Trinko alleged that this refusal violated Verizon's obligations under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and thereby also amounted to anticompetitive and exclusionary conduct. The Supreme Court said "Verizon's alleged insufficient assistance in the provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under this Court's existing refusal-to-deal precedents. This conclusion would be unchanged even if we considered to be established law the essential facilities doctrine crafted by some lower courts. We have never recognized such a doctrine and we find no need to recognize it or to repudiate it here."
In Europe, the decision of the European Court of Justice(ECJ) in the 1998 Bronner case has set a higher standard for the application of the essential facilities doctrine. The case concerned a claim by an Austrian newspaper publisher, Bronner, that the refusal of its competitor, Mediaprint, to grant Bronner access to its newspaper home delivery network constituted an abuse of dominance. The Court held that it was necessary to show that:
1. refusal of the service would be likely to eliminate all competition in the daily newspaper market; 2. the refusal was incapable of being objectively justified; and 3. access to the service was indispensable to Bronner's business, in that there was no actual or potential substitute for that home delivery scheme.
The ECJ argued that it was necessary, at least, to establish that it was not economically viable to create a second home-delivery scheme for the distribution of daily newspapers with a circulation comparable to that of the newspapers distributed by the existing scheme. It was not enough to argue that such a scheme would be less advantageous. Hence the ruling emphasizes that the essential facilities doctrine is applicable only in exceptional circumstances; and that the purpose of EC competition policy is to protect the state of competition in the market, not individual competitors. Is the names-and-presence directory of each network a bottleneck? In principle, yes: it would be difficult for a competitor to achieve the consumer co-ordination required to replicate the directory; there is no real cost for the owner to give access to the directory; and a small IM network may need access to a large network's directory in order to be viable. This was the argument of FCC chairman William Kennard, when he said letting the AOL-Time Warner merger go forward without specific IM constraints was "tantamount to allowing a single entity to control the nation's phone system". See also Faulhaber (2002b) . The same argument has been applied in the U.S. to voice mail services and subscriber lists for telephone directories. It is likely to arise in the U.K. in a number of diverse situations e.g., with mobile networks' portals on 3G; pay-TV; control over content; conditional access systems.
A more complex situation involves the bottleneck of termination with competing networks. To illustrate this, consider call termination on mobile networks. In this case, there are typically several alternative networks. Access to the network does not, therefore, constitute a bottleneck, since the user can choose between several alternatives and the fixed (and sunk) costs of access for the user are low. But the pricing structure on these networks creates de facto bottlenecks. In countries where calls are paid only by the calling party (the calling-party-pays, or CPP, principle), the receiving party will have little incentive to change providers when the price of terminating calls goes up. The only way to reach a particular end user is to call and terminate the call on the network to which that user is subscribed. If the end user were paying for receiving the call, it would react to a potential abuse of monopoly power by changing providers; but the fact that it does not pay for that service generates an inelastic demand and a result equivalent to a bottleneck. Hence the EU Guidelines allow the potential definition of two separate mobile markets, one for call origination and one for call termination, and recognise the problems of low incentives to compete on prices for terminating traffic. U.K. regulation has gone further, concluding that call termination on each mobile network is a relevant market where price regulation is needed due to the existence of insufficient competitive pressures.
There are a number of possibilities for the source of the bottleneck in this situation. First, there is some cost to duplicating connection: with mobile networks, most users have one subscription; only one SIM card can be slotted into a 'phone; multiple SIM card hand-sets are not (yet) on the market. Once a mobile network has been chosen, it is typically costly (in time and effort) to switch supplier; and so users are `locked-in'. But these considerations apply just as well to call origination. Are there factors particular to termination? It has been noted that there is an externality between callers and receivers, so that one side of the call does not take into account fully both the benefits and costs (including the price) incurred by the other side. Under the CPP, this can create incentives for high termination charges: competition shifts towards attracting subscribers; profits from termination are used to subsidize subscription. See, for example, Jeon et al. (2004) .
Finally, and probably most importantly, there is a distortion created by asymmetric regulation. In the case of mobile termination, in most countries the majority of the calls for which termination charges are levied come from fixed network operators (FNOs) rather than from other mobile operators. In the U.K. (and many other countries) the termination charges levied by the fixed operators (such as BT) are regulated and capped close to cost. If the mobile operators set their termination charges above cost, and the fixed operators do not, there is a net flow of revenue from the fixed network and its customers to the mobile networks and their customers. This may more than compensate for the loss of business from higher charges. Hence, in these circumstances, high termination charges are potentially profitable for mobile operators. (See Littlechild (2004a) and Jeon et al. (2004) for more on the CPP and receiver-pays-principle; and Gans and King (2000) for a formal model of this story.)
This digression on call termination bottlenecks on mobile networks has served to highlight a key issue: it is important to identify the source of the bottleneck before concluding that a bottleneck exists. Not all bottlenecks are caused by standard economies of scale: some may arise because of demandside scale economies. The different types of bottleneck have different implications for the form of competition and hence the regulatory approach that should be adopted. (See e.g., Faulhaber (2002a) .) But also not every bottleneck is actually a bottleneck. I would argue that the mobile call termination "bottleneck" is not in fact a bottleneck, but an artefact of particular pricing structures (CPP plus regulated fixed-line termination charges).
How does the notion of essential facility, and the competition law approach to access, relate to telecommunications regulation? The latter is set by the New Regulatory Framework (NRF) for electronic communications networks and services, brought into effect in 2003 by the European Commission. The NFR specifies that, if in a given country a company is found to have significant market power (SMP) in the supply of a service included in the list of wholesale markets, then the national regulatory agency (NRA) may impose on the dominant operator an obligation to provide that service to third parties " inter alia, in situations where the [NRA] considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, or would not be in the end-user's interest".
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The conditions under which access must be granted in telecommunications are therefore significantly broader than those specified by competition law. (See Oldale and Padilla (2004) for further discussion.) Since a pure bottleneck has, by definition, no good substitutes in use, and cannot be reproduced easily, it is likely to constitute a separate market under the market-definition approach of the Commission's SMP guidelines. It could, therefore, be concluded that any firm with a bottleneck has SMP in the bottleneck market. Hence SMP is central to the granting of access in telecoms networks-in contrast to the essential facilities doctrine, which requires objective justification of the need for access.
Why does this difference between competition policy and telecoms regulation matter? Because it points to the central tension in access: the trade-off between ex post competition and ex ante innovation incentives. As Advocate General Jacobs stated in the Bronner case (by Oldale and Padilla (2004) ):
"[I]n the long term it is generally pro-competitive and in the interest of consumers to allow a company to retain for its own use facilities which it has developed for the purpose of its business. For example, if access to a production, purchasing or distribution facility were allowed too easily there would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing facilities. Thus while competition was increased in the short term, it would be reduced in the long term. Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the benefits,. Thus the mere fact that by retaining a facility for its own use a dominant undertaking retains an advantage over a competitor cannot justify requiring access to it." At the same time, the courts recognize that ex ante incentives are relevant only when investment is required to create the bottleneck. There is an important difference between firms which have invested and firms which have obtained the right of using a certain facility without having borne the risk of its creation or having paid for it.
This trade-off is recognized, of course, in telecoms regulation-it is precisely this concern that forces a choice between service-and facilities-based competition (see the previous section on the local loop). It is noteable, however, that competition policy tends to come down on the opposite side of the debate to telecoms regulation.
A second area in which competition policy and telecoms regulation differ is in their attitude toward vertical integration.
Separation and Vertical Integration
The Phase 1 TSR report raises explicitly the question of the structural separation of BT. Stephen Carter, Ofcom's chief executive, has referred to this issue as "elephant in the corner": the perennial question that has hung in the air ever since the start of privatization of BT in 1984. Despite hopes to the contrary, it has become the question that has generated the most debate. (It is, after all, the most specific and direct of the five questions in the Phase 1 report.)
The arguments for and against vertical separation can be found in many other places, so I do not repeat them here. See Farrell and Weiser (2003) and Rey et al. (2001) for useful summaries of the arguments; and e.g., Littlechild (2004b) for a recent call for vertical separation. Instead, I should like to look at the question from a slightly different angle: when does a vertically-integrated firm have incentives to make an efficient decision towards separation?
If an upstream monopolist, or owner of a bottleneck, chooses not to compete in the downstream market, then it prefers that downstream products-the complements to its product-be supplied cheaply, innovatively, and efficiently. Thus, in choosing how to interact with downstream firms (e.g., in providing access to its upstream product), such a firm has a clear incentive to choose the pattern that will best provide its customers with end-products. That is, the upstream firm has an incentive to internalize the complementarities between the markets.
What about when an upstream monopolist chooses to integrate downstream? The policy concern in this case is the ability of the upstream firm to establish a dominant position downstream. This policy concern is mitigated by the fact that, in certain circumstances, the upstream monopolists will act efficiently in deciding whether or not to integrate downstream. In these same circumstances, the vertically-integrated firm will welcome innovations by downstream rivals. In other words, given the right circumstances, vertical integration does not raise economic policy concerns.
A simple numerical example (taken from Farrell and Weiser (2003) ) illustrates the point. Suppose that the upstream monopolist could integrate into the downstream market, and by participating in that market improve the value of the upstream product to users from £100 to £105, while breaking even on its downstream product. Then, it will certainly profit from vertical integration; and this is (socially) efficient, since integration increases value.
Suppose, on the other hand, that the upstream monopolist contemplates integrating downstream, monopolizing that market, and making a profit of £20 per user there while users value the upstream product at £70 rather than at £100. Because the £20 profit is less than the £30 harm created by this action, the integrated monopolist will lose by such a strategy. And such a move would not be socially desirable either, since overall value is lower. Of course, if the monopolist could make a profit of £40 per user in the downstream market, rather than £20 in doing so, then it would choose to integrate and monopolize the downstream market. But, in this case, this would be efficient.
So, in this example, the monopolist's profits follow social welfare; and hence the monopolist makes efficient decisions about integration into and monopolization of the downstream market. The upstream monopolist cannot increase its overall profit by monopolizing the downstream market, because it could always have charged a higher price in the first place; it has no incentive to take profits or inefficiently hamper or exclude rivals in the downstream market because it can appropriate the benefits of from better or cheaper downstream products in its pricing of the upstream product. Farrell and Weiser (2003) refer to this situation as 'ICE': the incentives of an upstream monopolist to internalize complementary efficiencies. See also Rey et al. (2001) for a similar analysis.
This argument is closely related to the "one monopoly profit" theory made famous by the Chicago School and Posner and Easterbrook (1981) : "there is only one monopoly profit to be made in a chain of production". But there is a distinct difference between the two. The traditional Chicago School argument would maintain that the upstream monopolist cannot gain by inefficiently leveraging its market power into the downstream market. The argument here is that, in addition, the upstream monopolist gains from an efficient downstream market-whether it involves perfect competition, integration and monopolization, granting access to a limited set of downstream firms, or whatever. In the strongest form of this argument, competition law and regulation need not worry even if a vertically-integrated firm engages in exclusionary behaviour in the downstream market.
This paints a very stark picture of incentives towards vertical behaviour. There are several qualifications to this basic story: ways in which the upstream monopolist's incentives can depart from efficiency. A primary reason is that regulation, imposed for whatever good reasons, at the upstream level encourages the monopolist to seek additional, and perhaps inefficient, profits in the downstream market. A second reason is that the upstream monopolist may view downstream rivals as potential competitors in the upstream market. Consequently, it may eliminate downstream competition to eliminate the possibility of upstream competition. This argument is behind the provision in the US 1996 Telecommunications Act, restricting entry by local telephony providers into the long-distance market. A third reason is that the degree of complementarity between upstream and downstream products may be variable. I have so far assumed (implicitly) that one unit of the downstream product requires one unit of the upstream product. But in some cases, the downstream product may be sold without the upstream input; for example, a product for one platform-say, broadband transport-may also be sold over another-say, narrowband transport. Whinston (1990) shows that in this situation, the broadband transport provider may try to control the downstream market. See Rey and Tirole (2003) for further discussion, as well as an argument that integration and foreclosure can save the upstream monopolist from Coasian dissipation of profits.
Despite these qualifications, modern competition law generally supposes that, with limited and fairly easily diagnosed exceptions, dominant firms face efficient incentives towards vertical choices. In contrast, telecommunications policy has moved increasingly towards mandating access. A key issue for future policy, then, is: which stance is appropriate in telecommunications? Are the conditions for efficient vertical behaviour the exception or the rule in telecoms? In traditional telecommunications markets, the upstream market was heavily price-regulated, and so there was good reason to doubt the efficiency of incentives. In general, competition policy and telecommunications regulation give different answers to these questions. How these approaches are reconciled will have important consequences for ex ante incentives for innovation and ex post competition.
This trade-off is familiar, not only from telecommunications, but also intellectual property (IP). In IP, monopoly rents are granted to successful innovators. Despite the ex post deadweight loss that this entails, it improves ex ante incentives to innovate. When the balance is struck correctly, this system is welfare-improving. An important issue, then, is how much profit to award to the innovator, in terms of the scope of IP protection (e.g., the length and breadth of a patent). Note that all criteria of essential facilities are often met by IP: IP is costly to duplicate; there is no real (ex post) cost to the owner granting access to IP; and when IP is highly innovative, it often confers monopoly power on the innovator. It is interesting to note that the same sort of debate is occurring in that field also. Many commentators are calling for ideas to be "open source": see e.g., Lessig (2001) . Others (for example, Landes and Posner (2002) ) advocate extended property rights, to improve both ex ante incentives and ex post management of the IP.
Conclusions
The scale of the task facing Ofcom at its outset was daunting. Much progress has been made in getting to grips with two of the biggest monoliths in the UK: the BBC and BT. Ofcom's picture of broadcasting has come into focus. It is broadly coherent, although still lacks the evidence required to back-up the hard quantitative decisions. The telecommunications picture is much less clear, and we await the next report to see the direction that Ofcom has planned, especially for the structure of BT. The challenge for Ofcom is to extend policy from the current problem of the copper-wire local loop, to develop a consistent framework for the treatment of bottlenecks.
